Negotiating compensation in Ghana's mining sector: Community valuer's selection dynamics and governance implications

Abstract

Compensation is a critical element in land appropriation for mining investment. It is a catalyst that drives land access and social license from affected landowners and other users. Thus, its determination process is fundamental to achieving a congenial atmosphere for the investment to thrive. This study explores the dynamics in the selection of community valuer/consultant, one of the key actors in the mine land acquisition and compensation negotiation process within Ghana's mining regulatory framework. Using the Newmont Ahafo projects in Ghana as a case study, the study interviewed respondents made up of affected farmers, landowners, community leaders, and chiefs across six mining communities for their perspectives on the selection of the community valuer and the work output. The results revealed that while the law provides for the engagement of a valuer to support affected people in mining land acquisition, there are no guidelines on the selection of this consultant. In practice, the selection processes have been fraught with undemocratic processes driven by interferences from powerful actors – traditional authorities, mines, and local politicians. This often led to the imposition of valuers on mine-affected communities with concomitant contestations and factionalism. These protract the land acquisition process, lead to delays of projects, community development, and escalate project costs, which undermine the investment climate - triggering the government's interventions to suppress dissenting groups. The results further showed that stakeholders accept the role of community valuer but have reservations about the neutrality and impartiality of the valuer, as the services are pre-financed by the mines. The findings highlight the need for improvement in the regulatory environment to instill sanity and order in the selection process and inject confidence and trust in the services of the community consultant. The study thus recommends a review of the legislation to provide means for selecting a community valuer and put in place mechanisms to improve trust in the prefinancing arrangement for the services of the community valuer without compromising performance. • There is no legal or regulatory clarity for the selection of the community valuer. • There is limited community participation in the selection of the community valuer. • The prefinancing model raises questions on the neutrality of the community valuer. • Factionalism and contestation among actors delay and increase the mine project cost.