Inelegant enforcement of anti-corruption laws and good governance: a persistent catalyst for coups d’état and poverty in Africa

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to scrutinise the intricate relationship between the inadequate enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the application of good governance and the persisting prevalence of coups d'état and poverty in Africa. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a doctrinal legal research approach, synthesising existing literature while extensively analysing primary and secondary legal sources. Its primary aim is to scrutinise the intricate relationship between the inadequate enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the application of good governance and the persisting prevalence of coups d'état and poverty in Africa. The choice of case study countries Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan stems from their historical significance, regional diversity, data accessibility and potential insights into the interplay among anti-corruption enforcement, governance, poverty and coups d'état in Africa. Findings The enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the promotion of good governance are indispensable for democracy and economic stability; their suboptimal enforcement directly contributes to coups d'état and the worsening of poverty in African nations. It emphasises the imperative for African countries to consistently and proficiently enforce anti-corruption laws and adhere to principles of good governance, effectively and responsibly, to mitigate coups d'état and alleviate poverty in the region. Originality/value This study designs a model strategy for combating coups d'état and corruption in Africa as contribution to knowledge in the field of study.