Epistemic suicide: self-inflicted knowledge suppression and the African development predicaments

Abstract

The paper proposes a philosophical re-evaluation of epistemic injustice by introducing the concept of epistemic suicide, which refers to the self-inflicted suppression of indigenous knowledge. Whereas Miranda Fricker’s account centres on externally imposed epistemic harms, epistemic suicide highlights how internalized hierarchies lead communities to abandon their epistemic resources. Focusing on Africa’s development crisis, particularly Nigeria’s electoral democracy, this study argues that epistemic failure stems not only from colonial legacy but also from internal complicity in knowledge erasure. Epistemic suicide here is distinct from Dotson’s testimonial silencing and Tobi’s appreciative silencing, which reflect passive exclusion rather than active self-sabotage. As a constructive response, the paper proposes epistemic creativity, the intentional reconstruction of knowledge practices through both indigenous and external resources, as a path to restoring intellectual agency. Through historical and analytical methods, the study demonstrates that epistemic creativity, grounded in Afro-re-constructivism, enables Africans to reclaim epistemic autonomy and envision new, self-determined models of development.